Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
ECON Publications

Department of Economics

1980

State and Local Government Expenditure Determinants: The
Traditional View and a New Approach
Roy W. Bahl
Georgia State University, rbahl@gsu.edu

Marvin Johnson
University of Wisconsin-Madison, mbjohns1@wisc.edu

Michael J. Wasylenko
Syracuse University, mjwasyle@syr.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_facpub
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Bahl, Roy W. Marvin Johnson, and Michael Wasylenko. "State and Local Government Expenditure
Determinants: The Traditional View and a New Approach," in Public Employment and State and Local
Government Finance, edited by Roy W. Bahl, Jr., Jesse Burkhead, and Bernard Jump, Jr., Cambridge, MA:
Ballinger Publishing Co., 1980.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Economics at ScholarWorks @
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in ECON Publications by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.

JO Public Employment and State and Local Government Finance

In the sense of viewing the community's preferences as those of
an individual, the median voter approach parallels the constrained
maximization approach. In the sense that the political decisions are
analyzed, it parallels the public choice approach. 11
The budget maximization or bureaucratic approach is based on the
notion that government bureaus maximize the size of their budget.
Niskanen, the founding father of the budget maximization approach,
argues that the dominant (indifference curve) theories neglect the
relevant personal objectives of government bureaucrats. Specifically,
he argues that the utility of a decision-making bureaucrat is a func
tion of such characteristics as the salary, perquisites, power, pat
ronage, ease of managing and ease of making changes that go with
the job-and that these variables are "a positive monotonic function
of the total budget of the bureau" and that "budget maximization is
an adequate proxy even for those bureaucrats with relatively low
pecuniary motivation and a relatively high motivation for making
changes in the public interest." 12 Budget maximization is possible
because society is presented with all-or-nothing choices regarding a
bureau's output, and thus must live with an overproduction of the
goods and services by bureaus. Far from maximizing the welfare of
society or the median voter, a budget maximizer's only concern is
to spend the total obtainable budget and to lobby for additional
funds.
The public choice school of thought has made considerable in
roads in all areas of interest to public finance economists. 13 The
recurring motif of public choice work is that the traditiona l con
strained maximization model, based heavily on models of individual
con��mer behavior, simply is not applicable to the study of social
dec1S1ons made by "groups" of individuals. Public choice involves
the ap_plic�tio� of economic analysis to the political decision process.
By this cntenon, the median voter approach can be considered a
pub:ic choice approach even though it also involves a form of con
strai�ed m�ximization. Still, there is something different about the
�ubhc choice approach: it is concerned with the rules by which deci
sion� �e �ade and with the motives of decision makers. Constrained
maximi�ation models abstract from such detail and attribute motives
and r_ atwnal behavior to the governmental unit. Perhaps there is a
.
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contmuum from pure government as a consummg
umt ( constraine d
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maximization) to government as a group of rational self-interested
p pursuing their goals within a set of rules (public choice). In
f:� tamework, the median voter approach is a timid first step to
·
ward the public choice end.
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Finally, in an organization theory approach, public decision mak
ers a re seen as facing a problem of resource allocation that must be
solved by a certain set of "internal" rules and processes. These insti
tutions resolve the inevitable competition among the subunits of
government for scarce public resources. The whole process works
within a number of legal and political constraints, the most crucial of
which is that the total budget must be balanced. An important facet
of organizational theory is that budget choices are made on an incre
mental basis. Instead of evaluating the whole budget each year deci
sion makers do pretty much the same thing they did the year b�fore
with small adjustments made in response to changes in revenue and
with partial solutions to old problems, new problems, and changes in
emphasis. Some have argued that incrementalism, a basic tenet of the
organization theory approach, is a rational approach to as well as a
realistic description of, the public budgeting process. 14' Others have
used the organization theory approach to analyze the fiscal behavior
of local governments. 15
Models of fiscal behavior based on organization theory are not
readily compared with constrained maximization or public choice
models; the two types of models attempt to do different things. The
organization theory approach attempts to describe the process by
which fiscal choices are made and to predict behavior of a single eco
nomic unit. Constrained maximization and median voter models are
used to identify underlying reasons for fiscal differences among units
of government and to explain patterns of response (such as the re
sponse to various types of intergovernmental grant). Organization
theory, by assuming that budget decisions are made incrementally,
cannot deal with questions about why fiscal behavior differs. Con
strained maximization, and, to a lesser extent, public choice models,
have not achieved (and are not likely to achieve) the institutional
realism possible under organization theory.
. Apart from these conceptual models of expenditure determina
tion, there are more straightforward "statistical" approaches. These
st u?i�s identify "plausible" determinants of government expenditure
vanat10ns (for example, certain expenditures must be higher where
�here is a greater proportion of high-income families and where there
i� a large land area); they then attempt to verify these plausible rela
tions with statistical significance. These studies are formulated on
an a priori basis without explicit discussion of a utility function
��dg�� constraint, production function, or decision-making mecha:
_ism. Very often, however, they lead to about the same specifica
ti on of the estimating equation as do the studies that build from a

